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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ly relevant that its relevance 16 is outweighed by the danger that
the testimony would be misused by the jury.17 This determina-
tion is supported by the observation that men commonly believe
silence after arrest is good strategy. It is urged that courts
must require at least a high degree of relevance in such cases
because of the danger that a jury is likely to give primary
weight to the accusatory statements rather than to the resulting
ambiguous silence of the accused.
In addition, it seems unfair as a matter of policy to allow
the state to place an accused in a position in which he must
speak or suffer an adverse inference.' To allow such conduct
seems contrary to the "spirit if not the letter""' of the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination. The court in the in-
stant case, in declaring that the defendant had a "right to re-
main silent, ' 20 seems to accede to this principle. Superadding
this constitutional consideration to the weakness of the infer-
ence of guilt to be drawn from the defendant's ambiguous si-
lence, the instant decision settles the water muddied by State v.
Ricks by a compelling reaffirmation of the principle that silence
to statements ordinarily calling for a response is not admissible
as an admission when the defendant is under arrest.2'
Herman Stewart, Jr.
INSURANCE - DIRECT ACTION - BREACH OF NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS As DEFENSE
Plaintiff, injured in a collision with an automobile insured
by defendant, recovered a default judgment against its operator
who was an insured under the omnibus clause of defendant's
policy.' Neither the owner- named insured- nor the defend-
16. For an analytical discussion of relevance see James, Relevancy, Probabil-
ity and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. RaV. 689 (1941).
17. See McCORMICK § 246, at 529.
18. See State v. Dills, 208 N.C. 313, 315, 180 S.E. 571, 572 (1935): "We
think in remaining silent the appellants acted within their legal rights, since no
man should be forced to incriminate himself or to make false statements to avoid
so doing."
19. Helton v. United States, 221 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1955).
20. 243 La. 793, 799, 147 So. 2d 392, 394 (1962).
21. In finding the trial court committed reversible error the court stated that
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation of witnesses was violated. See
LA. CONST. art. I, § 9. This problem is outside of the scope of this Note. For a
general discussion of the right to confrontation see 5 WiMORaE § 1397.
1. "Insured" was defined in the policy as the named insured or anyone using
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ant were made parties to that suit. The insurer's first notice of
the action was plaintiff's attempt to enforce the default judg-
ment against it under the Louisiana Direct Action Statute. 2 De-
fendant insurer refused payment, contending that lack of noti-
fication of suit - expressly required by the policy - relieved it
of liability. Reversing the district court, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeal sustained defendant's contention. Held, compli-
ance with this notification requirement of the policy is a condi-
tion precedent to a direct action against the insurer to enforce
a prior judgment against an insured. Hallman v. Marquette
Cas. Co., 149 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
While Louisiana's Direct Action Statute8 allows an injured
party4 to proceed directly against a tortfeasor's 5 insurer, the
rather liberal rights6 conferred are not without limitations ;7
such action must be brought "within the terms and limits of the
policy." The requirement of most automobile liability policies
that notice of accidents and resulting suits be given immediately
to the insurer have been held reasonable. 9 Louisiana courts take
the position that the terms "immediately" and "promptly" mean
within a reasonable time.' In most jurisdictions the insured's
the automobile with his permission. The driver borrowed the automobile with
the named insured's permission and was therefore an "insured" under the policy.
Hallman v. Marquette Cas. Co., 149 So. 2d 131, 132 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
2. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950).
3. Iblid.
4. Ibid.: "... or his or her heirs or survivors .
5. It must be kept in mind that the liberality of R.S. 22:655 can in no man-
ner dispense with the necessity of fault on the part of the insured. Continental
Casualty Co. v. Quebedeaux, 234 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1956); West v. Monroe
Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950) ; Davies v. Consolidated Underwriters,
199 La. 459, 6 So. 2d 351 (1942) ; Musmeci v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 146
So. 2d 496 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
6. Only Wisconsin has gone as far as Louisiana in allowing a suit against
the insurer before the tortfeasor is found liable, and the Wisconsin Statute (WIs.
STAT. ANN. §§ 85.93, 260.11 (1951) has been criticized as not providing any true
liberalities. Comment, 22 LA. L. REV. 243, 245 (1962).
7. By the provisions of R.S. 22:655 the injured party "shall have a right of
direct action .. .within the terms and limits of the policy in the parish where
the accident or injury occurred or in the parish where the insured or the insurer
is domiciled . . . provided the accident or injury occurred in the state of Lou-
isiana."
8. Ibid.
9. The court in the Hallman case, 149 So. 2d at 134, quoted 29A AM. JUR.
Insurance § 1482 (1960) : "While in some cases involving earlier types of policies
the question arose whether the insured is under an obligation, under the 'co-
operation clause' of a liability policy, to forward suit papers to the insurer, liabil-
ity policies now contain an express provision requiring the insured [to forward
notice] .... It is well settled that such a provision is a reasonable, valid, and
enforceable one."
10. Jackson v. State Farm Mat. Automobile Ins. Co., 211 La. 9, 23 So. 2d
765 (1945) ; Jones v. Shehee-Ford Wagon & Harness Co., 183 La. 293, 163 So.
129 (1935) Howard v. Rowan, 154 So. 382 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
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failure to give notice of either accident or suit vitiates the in-,
jured party's direct action against the insurer even though the
injured party is unaware of the provisions of the insurance con-
tract.1 The direct action depends on the insured's strict compli-
ance with the policy provisions.'2  However, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court in West v. Monroe Bakery,13 faced with a failure
to give notice of an accident, settled a conflict in the jurispru-
dence 14 by announcing that an injured party's rights were
"fixed"' 5 at the time of the accident and could not be affected
by a subsequent breach of the notice provisions. 6 The court,
determining that the direct action statute "expresses the public
policy of this state that an insurance policy against liability is
not issued primarily for the protection of the insured but for
the protection of the public,' 7 held that the limitation "within
the terms and limits of the policy" did not include the require-
ment of notice but referred only to the maximum amount re-
coverable under the policy and any warranties or conditions
11. See Annots., 18 A.L.R.2d 443 (1951), 106 A.L.R. 516, 532-37 (1937), 76
A.L.R. 201 (1932).
12. 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 1047 (1946) : "The rights of the injured person
can rise no higher than those of the insured, [and in an action by the injured
party] the company . . . can set up a defense that notice of accident or claim
was not given as required."
13. 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950).
14. See, e.g., Jones v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 185 So. 509 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1939) ; U-Drive-It Car Co. v. Friedman, 153 So. 500 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1934) ; Bougon v. Volunteers of America, 151 So. 797 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1934) ; Edwards v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 123 So. 162 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929).
The ruling that an injured party is not affected by breaches of the policy
after his injury was first announced in the Edwards case. A contrary rule was
developed some five years later in Howard v. Rowan, 154 So. 382 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1934) and as a result two lines of authority developed with the West case
finally settling the issue by affirmatively following the Edwards case. The How-
ard case was designated as the minority rule in Louisiana. Arguments for the
Edwards rule, Comment, 15 TUL. L. REV. 79 (1940); against, Comment, 10
TUL. L. REV. 69 (1935).
15. This "fixed" language first appeared in Judge Kennon's dissent, 39 So. 2d
620, 627 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949), and was quoted with favor by the Supreme
Court in its final disposition of the case. See New Zealand Ins. Co. v. Holloway,
123 F. Supp. 642 (W.D. La. 1954) (rights of the injured party crystallize at the
time of the accident).
16. It is necessary to distinguish between a breach prior to an accident and
one occurring after the accident. In Phillips v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 193
La. 314, 321, 190 So. 565, 568 (1939) the court, in ruling on a breach committed
before an accident said the insurer was absolved from liability. New Zealand Ins.
Co. v. Holloway, 123 F. Supp. 642, 648 (W.D. La. 1954) said: "Although [Phil-
lips] was decided in 1939, its holding is certainly valid . . . . This right against
the insurer . . . cannot be prejudiced by the insured's subsequent breach of policy,
but where the policy breach occurred before the accident, . . . cancellation may
be obtained by the insurer, and the rights of the third parties under the voided
policy are lost."
17. 217 La. at 210, 46 So. 2d at 130. The court quoted from Davies v. Con-
solidated Underwriters, 199 La. 459, 476, 6 So. 2d 351, 357 (1942).
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which must have been fulfilled at the time of the accident for
the insurer to incur liability. 8
The issue in the instant case- effect of failure to give no-
tice of suit- was res nova in this state ;19 prior cases dealt only
with failure to notify of accidents.20 The court, without citing
or attempting to distinguish the West line of cases on notice of
accident,2 1 held that one of the "terms" of the policy that must
be complied with as a condition precedent to recovery under the
Direct Action Statute was that the insured immediately forward
notice of suit to the insurer. Failure to receive notice of the
suit was a defense to liability under the policy and therefore to
a direct action based on the policy.22
The majority of states do not distinguish between the fail-
ure to give notice of accident and of suit, but condition recovery
on receipt of both notices as required by the "terms" of the pol-
icy.23 This is open to criticism since the failings do not equally
affect the insurer's ability to protect his interests. An insurer,
although not notified of the accident, normally can acquire all
necessary information about the accident after notice of a pend-
ing suit.24 However, to require an insurer to satisfy a judgment
18. The court added that the insurer's protection in a case where it received
no notice would lie in a suit against its insured on the basis of the insured's
breach of the contract provisions. Such reasoning raises interesting questions.
While this would meet traditional contract practices when applied to the named
insured, should such an action be allowed against an omnibus insured who was
not a party to the contract of insurance and would have little if any knowledge
of its terms? Also, even in such a countersuit against the named insured, would
the insurer have to prove it could have defeated the injured party's claim had
notice been given?
19. Hallman v. Marquette Cas. Co., 149 So. 2d 131, 132 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1963).
20. See note 14 supra.
21. The West case was followed in New Zealand Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 123
F. Supp. 642 (W.D. La. 1954) ; Dumas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 125
So. 2d 12 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960); Kimball v. Audubon Ins. Co., 103 So. 2d
529 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958) ; Churchman v. Ingram, 56 So. 2d 297 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1951).
22. From the Hallman case, the surest course for the plaintiff's attorney is to
personally forward all process to the insurer, whether that insurer is a party to
the proceeding or not. LA. R.S. 22:1522 (1950) provides: "The casualty and
surety division of the Louisiana insurance rating commission shall furnish to any
claimant, upon request . . . the name of the insurer in personal injury claims,
and the provisions and conditions of coverage in the policy . . . of insurance." Of
course, the above statute might not be of assistance in a facutal situation similar
to Hallman. Whether the commission could inform an attorney as to who was
the insurer of a person driving an automobile merely loaned to him is open to
doubt. Such action could possibly be considered rendering a conclusion of law, a
function very probably outside the limits of the commission's powers.
: 23. See, e.g., Royal Indemnity Co. v. Morris, 37 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1929);
Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colthurst, 36 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1929) and authori-
ties cited therein.
24. Reid v. Monticello, 44 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950) (police reports
19631
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rendered in a suit of which it had no notice and therefore no
opportunity to defend grates against the ingrained principle
that every man shall have his day in court.2 5 It is unfortunate
that the court in the instant case did not refer to the West rule
that liability under the Direct Action Statute is fixed at the time
of injury and expressly impose a limitation upon it. The de-
cision should be so interpreted; and, as interpreted, the noted
decision preserves the Louisiana policy of protecting the in-
jured party except when that policy conflicts with the defend-
ant insurer's fundamental right to a judicial hearing.2 6 Thus
the accident-suit distinction appears justifiable and desirable;
it supports the Hallman decision and reconciles the Hallman and
West cases.2
7
John M. King
PARTITION - THE EFFECT OF R.S. 13:4985 ON PARTITIONS
MADE WITHOUT REPRESENTATION OF ALL CO-OWNERS
"No one can be compelled to hold property with another, un-
less the contrary has been agreed upon; any one has the right
to demand the division of a thing held in common, by the action
of partition."' The Code characterizes partition as a "sort of
exchange" by which one's right in part of a thing is exchanged
for others' rights in the remainder which becomes his alone.
2
and investigation conducted by injured party's counsel normally furnish necessary
details of accident).
25. For recent statements of this ancient heritage see United States ea7 rel.
TVA v. McCoy, 198 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. N.C. 1961); Baltz v. The Fair, 178
F. Supp. 691 (N.D. Ill. 1959) ; Beck v. Jarret, 363 P.2d 215 (1961) ; O'Niel v.
Dux, 101 N.W.2d 588 (1960).
26. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (persons not parties to personam
actions are not bound by the judgment therein, and enforcement of the judgment
against such persons violates the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments).
27. By the combined decisions of West and Hallman, important qualifications
have been read into R.S. 22:655 (Direct Action Statute). Can it be assumed
that the Hallman rule will also apply to R.S. 32:900(F) (1) (Motor Vehicle Fi-
nancial Responsibility Act)? It has been held that a "motor vehicle liability
policy" as defined in the latter act is not the same as a general liability policy
under the former act. New Zealand Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 123 F. Supp. 642 (W.D.
La. 1954). Would this case be authority for not applying the Hallman decision
to cases falling under R.S. 32:900?
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1289 (1870).
2. Id. art. 1382. However, all exchanges which terminate ownership of prop-
erty in indivision are not necessarily partitions. Goodwin v. Chesneau's Heirs, 3
Mart.(N.S.) 409 (La. 1825). A sale by one heir to his coheir definitely termi-
nates the ownership in indivision, but this would be treated as a sale rather than
as a partition. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1405 (1870).
